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"Finance, Capital Harkets and Economic Growth in Japan"*

by
Hugh T. Patrick

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of financial inter
mediation during the course of Japan's postwar economic growth,

The main

focus is upon the sources of finance of the private corporate sector, and
particularly the role of domestic capital markets.

It will be shown that

external finance has been extremely important, especially for large firms,
but that the new issue of stocks and bonds has been relatively unimportant.
I explain why Japan's capital markets remain underdeveloped in what is
otherwise a highly developed, variegated, and reasonably sophisticated finan
cial system, and suggest some broad conclusions as to whether capital mar
ket underdevelopment has really had a seriously adverse impact.
The time period covered is from the early 1950's until mid-1969.
Allied Occupation of Japan formally ended in April, 1952.

The

By 1953 the

rapid inflation of early posti-,ar, renewed by the Korean War, had come to
an end, and wholesale price stability has continued since.

By 1954 the

reconstruction phase was completed, in that prewar levels of per capita
income and productivity levels had been re-attained (after some 18 years).
Moreover, the data are better from the early 1950's.

I place somewhat

*This research was financed by a Fulbright-Hays Center Faculty Fellowship
and a Yale University Concilium on International Studies grant for research
in Japan in 1968-69. Huch of the information, particularly on the stock
and bond markets, came from interviews with specialists at a variety of
financial institutions; they prefer to remain anonymous, but I wish to
express here my thanks for their assistance.
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greater emphasis on the more recent past in order to appraise the future
development of Japan's capital markets.

Economic Growth and the Importance of Financial Intermediation
Japan's postwar economic performance has been spectacular and unpre
cedented, bringing it to the forefront of the world's major industrial
nations.
rate;

2

1

Between 1952-1967 real GNP grew at a 9.6 percent average annual

in 1968 and 1969 the grm·Jth rate was somewhat higher.

Ci-JP in 1968

was $141.9 billion (current prices at the official exchange rate parity);
it will reach $200 billion in 1970.
Explanation of the causes of such rapid r;rowth is not the story to be
told here.

In brief

the major factors include: a high rate of invest

ment in plant and equipment and related infrastructure, spurred on by self
generating entrepreneurial optimism and rapid growth of gross domestic
saving; an unprecedented degree of technological absorption (mainly from
the United States), innovation, and diffusion; an ample supply of well
trained and highly motivated labor; and a strong export performance to
pay for the raw material and other imports essential to stoke the engine
of industrial growth.
1

.sy 1968 Japan ranked third in GNP (though still quite far behind
the United States and the USSR, and only somewhat ahead of West Germany)
yet only approximately 13th in GNP/capita, at $1400 at the official ex
change rate of ¥360 = $1. For a brief review of Japan's economic perfor
mance see Hugh T. Patrick, "The Phoenix Risen from the Ashes: Postwar
Japan," in James ll. Crowley, ed., Hodern East Asia: Essays in Interpreta
tion (New York: Harcourt, l$race and World, Inc., 1970).
2
- - This and following data are in real terms based on the newly re
vised national accounts which are in 1965 constant prices. See Japan,
Economic Planning Agency, Revised Report on ilational Income Statistics,
1951-1967 (August 1969) and for more recent data Bank of Japan, Statis
tics Department, Economic Statistics Honthly.
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Fixed investment i1as gro,;-m particularly rapidly--at a 15.4 percent
annual rate for the private sector between 1952-1967, and 13.3 percent
for the government.

As a consequence the proportion of fixed investment

1
in GNP has risen from just under 20 percent in the early 1950 s to more

than 30 percent during the 1960's (35.0 percent in 1968).

While the

government share in GIJP has increased (from 5.2 percent in 1952 to 8.7
percent in 1963), the private sector share has grown even more--from 12.1
to 26.3 percent.

Thus, most investment has been done by the private

sector, and that mainly by corporate business (see Table 1).

In the com

petition for investible resources the government's basic policy has been
to defer somewhat to private business investment demand and to gear its
expenditures to transportation, communications and other facilities com
plementary to private investment.

As a consequence, the provision of

public services has lagged; the widening gap between the relative supplies
of private and public consumption goods has been enhanced by the rapid
rate of urbanization (two-thirds of Japan's population now live in cities).
Housing supply has continuously lagged behind demand since the destruc
tion of World Oar II, though investment in housing has finally acceler
ated in the past few years.

An important cause of this lag is that

financial institutions 11ave not provided much housing credit, lending
instead to business.
Concommitant with the growth in investment has been a matching in
crease in gross domestic saving (Table 1).

Nost striking has been the

doubling in the personal sector saving rate out of disposable income (to

Table 1
SOURCES AND USES OF FlmDS JY SPENDHfG SECTOR, 1954-1967

(billion yen)

Source of Furds (Liabilities)
(s)

(P )

1

Corporate
Sector

Personal
Sector

Government
Sector

Jnternel-Gross Domestic Saving
:;.:et Saving
Capital Consumption Allowances

32,589.1
12,117.2
2.0,471.9

l;2,

342. 0
32,611.5
9,730.5

21,232.8
13,550.1
2,632.7

External-total
Prirr:ary Security Issue
Stock Issue
Bond Issue
Loans-domestic
Loans-foreign
Trade Credit
Otaer
Indirect Security Issue

E7,546.3
67,546.3
6,698.3
2,069.4
33,663.7
2,021.6
22,59S'.l
494.2

15,941.2
15,941.2

10,228.6
10,223.6

Total

C

I)

0

9,446.0
0

6,409.9
S5.3
0

I-:inancial
Sector

·-

--

67,505.7
1,556.3

..

3.373.2
191. 3

--·

\..•

~

--

161,221.C
95,272.4
6,698.3
G,572.2

6j 0 S49.Lf

46,482.9
3,769.2
29,009.0
740.8
65,)49.4

67,505.7

257,335.7

1,556.3

0

--·

161.3

•H'M

()

96,163.9
63,278.8
32,935.1

-··-

''
C.,502.8

Total Domestic
Economy

100,135.4

58,283.2

31,461.4

48,925.6
40,435.2
33,793.1
1,642.1
8,490.4

20,253.6
19,359 .(
7,513.2,
11,845.8
899. G

26,004.1
25,071.4
23,802.3
1,269.1
932.7

50,099.2

38,857.3

4,465.3

67,442.4

160,864.2

32,415.5
1,638.8
534. 2

4,006.7
2,698.9
854.9

723.0
100.5

57,769.6
2,260.1
7,121.3

')4,914.8
6,693.3
8,572.2
2),009.0
46,482.S
3,411.6
740.3

Uses of 'l<'und~ (assets)
(I)

Gross Domestic Investment
Fixed
Plant and Equipment
Housing
Inventories

i?inancial-total
(P )
a

Primary Claims
Stoel
iondr,
..:'radc. Credit
Loancl·-domes tic
Loam ... forei3n
Other

29,J09.0
Cl

1,131.0
102.5

0
0
0

452.9

61.8
0
0

366.4
194.3

. _,, .

95,BC.3

-··

84s86Go2

....

70,109.2
14,757.0
lC',.322.1

,

-~...
-·-

0

46,482.9
1,914.2
-3.9

I

.s:I

Table l

tn

Indirect Clait s
i.;oney
Time a1d S.:ving Deposits
Trust
Insurance
r,ank Londs
SecuritieQ Investment Trust
Stock and Equity in Financial
Ir,..,t:itutions
Ot1'.er

1'otal
1iscrepancy

Sourcef - Use~;

(contiuu(~d)

Cor·;)oratc
:,ector

:?crso!l,:l
Sector

17,683.7
5,925.3
3,417.6
736.2

34,850.6
6,777.5
17,411.2
2,237.3
4,,975.3
1,294.3

0

271.2
17.C

7J5. 8

1,975.2

444.C
'.315.2

99,024.3

SS,115.9

1,110.6

-~832. 7

339.)

(;ovcrt1 !~i!,~t
Sector

3,742.3
335.6
47).6
2 3.1
)
)

FL:ancial
Sector

?.,672.8

525.0
212.2
143.8
0

2,269.4
51.3

J

31,j. 6
2,5131_.4

Total ::.ouer;tic
Econom~

65,949.4
13,564.9
26,520.6
3,145.4
4,975.3
3,G34.S
864.9

6,471.1

1,10,J.5
11,942.S'

'f

G7,442.4

256,052.5

~1'.)2 •.)

G3.3

L333.2

T) ,46().

0

i
V,

I

I/ote ;:

~ource.

Primary dsset s differ from primary liatilities ½y the difference in forei~n loans, since the rest ··of
the--worl<l sector is exclu<led · similarly savin:a; differs from invest:,i_ent, due also to statistical
discrep,:i11cieE in estimation.
t~ugL T. Fat rick, · Financial Intermediation in Japan,·· Seventh Zushi Conference, January 1969
(forthcornir g in Japanese), Yale ::::conornic Growth Center Discussi-:m Paper 1Jo. 70 (July 31, 1969);
,aL·ccgrap:-.e d.
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19.7 percent in 1968).
of net profits;

2

1

The corporate sector has a high retention rate out

as the profit share in national income has increased so

has corporate net saving.

The government has also been a significant saver

(defined as the excess of current revenues over current expenditures).

3

An important characteristic of the Japanese economy is that the per
sonal sector has engaged in saving far in excess of its investment expendi
tures and has desired to hold financial assets, while the corporate sector
has invested far more than it has saved, as well as holding financial assets.
These relationships are made clear in Table 1.

Table 1 presents an aggre

gative cumulation of saving, investment, and net financial flows between
1954 and 1967 for the three domestic spendinr, sectors (corporate, personal,
and government) and the domestic financial sector (which for purposes of
simplification is assumed to do no saving and investment) including govern
ment tinancial institutions.

I divide financial claims into primary and

and indirect assets and liabilities, using the standard Gurley-Shaw termi
nology and classification.

4

1
The personal sector is a heterogeneous mix of wage earners, profes
sionals, farmers, and unincorporated business. Survey data indicate that
the urban worker saving rate has risen to about 20 percent of disposable
income.
2
The average saving rate for the corporate sector as a whole for 196567 was 78 percent; this is somewhat high because smaller companies are
able to underreport profits and thereby to evade taxation.
3
Simple regressions of saving on income (annual data, 1951-1967)
provide the following estimates of the marginal propensity to save: per
sonal sector, 19.8 percent; corporate sector, 79.6 percent; government
In all three regressions R2 is high but the
sector, 31.1 percent.
Durbin-Watson statistic is unsatisfactoril y low.
4
Primary claims are the external sources of funds (liabilities) of
spending units such as loans, stock, and bond issue, and trade credit;
indirect securities are the liabilities of financial institutions, such
as money, time deposits, and insurance reserves.

The data in Table 1 suggest a number of aggregative financial relation
ships which characterize the Japanese economy, notably regarding the
relative importance of alternative sources of financing for the three
spending sectors over the period 1954-1967.

1

First, the degree of reliance on financial intermediation and external
finance has been great.

The net increase in all primary debt between 1954-

1967 equalled the cumulated gross investment for the period.
high ratio as compared with other countries. 2

This is a

Similarly, in stock terms

Japan has a high rat:i.o of primary securities to real national wealth.

The

financial interrelations ratio (the ratio of all financial assets--both
primary and indirect securities--to real national wealth) is also very
large, at a level shared only by England (a legacy of government war debt)
and Switzerland (as international financial intermediary).

About 70 per-

cent of the Japanese primary debt was issued by corporate business, and
only slightly over 10 percent by the government sector.
Second, in contrast to the overall importance of finance, the capital
issue markets have played a relatively minor role.

Only 16 percent of

primary security issue was in stock (seven percent) and bonds (nine percent).

3

Of this 2.8 percentage points were sold directly to other spend-

ing units without going through capital markets.

Examples include

1

The following discussion is derived from Patrick, "Financial Inter
mediation in Japan" cited in Table 1.
2
For international comparisons see Raymond H. Goldsmith, The Deter
minants of Financial Structure, (Paris: OECD, Development Centre, 1966),
and his Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969).
3

Stock has been valued in the data at issue price rather than subsequent market value because this represents the funds which issuing cor
porations received and buyers paid.
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central government purchase of local government and government corporation
bonds, and the required purchase of Japan Telephone and Telegraph Company and
Japan National Railway Company bonds by corporate and personal customers,
and corporate purchase of shares in their subsidiarie s and related firms.
Another 3.3 percentage points were purchased directly through the capital
markets by individuals and other spending units; almost all (87) percent of

this was newly-issue d stock.

Thus, the predominant portion (9.9 percentage

points) of stock and bond issue was bought by financial intermediar ies, and
then not always willingly.
Third, of the three avenues of external financing-- direct financial
transaction s between deficit and surplus spendinz units, transaction s between
spending units via the capital markets, and intermediat ion by financial in
stitutions which buy primary liabilities (make loans, etc.) and sell their
indirect liabilities (create deposits, etc.)--fina ncial intermediat ion has
been dominant.

Financial institution s provided 63 percent of all external

funds obtained (primary securities issued) by spending units.

As noted

above, only 3.3 percent of external finance flowed through capital market
transaction s among spending units.

Direct transaction s among spending units

accounted for the remaining 33.7 percent; almost all has been inter-busin ess
trade credit.

Financial institution s paid for their acquisition of primary

(and indirect) assets with their own indirect liabilities .

About one-fifth

of the increase in financial system liabilities consisted of money, and
another two-fifths of time and savings deposits; insurance, 7.6 percent of
the total increase, was in third place.

Layering (the proportion of total

indirect claims held by financial intermediar ies themselves) has not been

-9-

great; the measured rate of 14.6 percent is a slight underestimate because
certain financial transactions among financial institutions cannot be ad
justed in the flow-of-funds data from a net to a gross basis.
Fourth, the foreign sector has been unimportant either as a source of
financing of domestic investment or as a use of domestic saving.

The small

influence of foreign financing holds for each of the spending sectors, and
for the financial sector as well.

This is not inconsistent with the view

that foreign borrowing has been important for Japan's postwar growth by easing
the balance of payments constraint, or significant for certain firms or in
dustries.
Fifth, the taxation method of accumulating saving has been of some
importance, accounting for almost one-fifth of gross saving and almost one
third of net saving.

While substantial, these ratios are not unusual; for

example, they are higher in France and West Germany.

The presumption is

that government saving has been used virtually entirely to finance government
investment--in large part directly but to some extent also by the transfer of
government sector saving to government financial institutions to be relent
to government sector institutions.

Typically, the central government saves

enough to finance more than its own investment, transferring the remainder
by a bewildering variety of routes to finance (most of) the excess investment
of local governments and public corporations.

Thus the taxation mechanism

has financed about four-fifths of government sector investment, but none of
the economy's private investment.

Rather, government financial institutions

(part of the financial sector) issued indirect liabilities (mostly postal
savings and life insurance) to private spending sectors, and lent to all
three spending sectors.
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Sixth, self-financ e by capital consumption allowances has been sub
stantial, amounting to one-third of gross investment (and gross savine)
for the economy as a whole and to more than 40 percent of the corporate
sector's gross investment.

As in the United States and West Germany, Japan

ese corporate depreciatio n is almost double its retained profits.

Though

capital consumption allowances were about the same proportion of GNP in
the early 1950's as in the United States, the ratio in Japan has subse
quently increased substantial ly (from 7.0 percent of GNP in 1952 to 12.8
percent in 1968).

While Japan's depreciatio n laws are somewhat more lenient

than in the United States, the main reason for the increase in the ratio has
been the continuing surge of fixed investment.
Seventh, trade credit has been large--30 percent of total primary
security issue and 33 percent of corporate sector borrowing.

Significant ly,

the increase in trade credit was more than 2 1/2 times as great as corporate
investment in inventories (and a substantial ly larger multiple in the per
sonal sector, mainly that of unincorpora ted business).

Trade credit has

been used in Japan not simply to finance inventories , but also for fi~ed
investment and the increase in financial assets.
One of the most important features of Japan's financial system is
that it is a disequilibri um system: in most financial markets demand is
greater than supply at the given interest rates.

Essentially , a structure

of interest rates has been imposed by the monetary authorities (the Minis
try of Finance and the Bank of Japan), supported on the whole by the

oligopolist ic larger financial institution s.

This structure of rates has

usually been below that which would have resulted solely from market forces,
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particularly in periods of monetary restriction.

Underlying this has been

the tendency in Japan's rapid-growth economy for ex ante investment to be
greater than ex ante saving.

Hence, at the given interest rates financial

institutions cannot b')rrow as much as they want from (surplus) spending
units; similarly most investors (deficit spending units) cannot borrow as
much as they want from financial institutions.
Not only has the interest rate structure been set by the monetary
authorities, the structure has been extremely inflexible.
strated in Table 2.

1

This is demon

Long-term interest rates have been particularly in

flexible in Japan, but even short-term rates have not moved greatly despite
wide cyclical fluctuation in economic growth and in the relative supplies
of and demands for various types of credit.

The administered, inflexible

control over the interest rate structure in the bond market is particularly
strong,. as discussed later.

The one exception has been call money rates,

which have been determined primarily by market forces.

2

Except for brief

occasions of extreme monetary ease, call rates have never b~en below the
issue yield on long-term government bonds, and have usually been above the
yields on new corporate bond issues.
There is some market-determined flexibility in effective interest
rates on private loans, but not sufficient to equilibrate demand with supply
1

The coefficients of variance would be even larger for the United
States, United Kingdom, and West Germany if the general increases in rates
in 1968-69 were included in the data.
2
At times, notably in the 1967-68 monetary restriction, the Bank of
Japan has put direct, if informal, pressure on participants in the call
market not to allow the call rr,te to rise too much.

Table 2
Internation al Comparison of Flexibility of I1terest Rates
(end of 1967, in percentage points)

Actual
Rate

JaEan
Degree of
Fluctuation

United States
Degree of
Actual
Fluctuation
Rate

U1ited Kingdom
Degree of
Actual
Fluctuation
Rite

---

West Germany
Degree of
Actual
Fluctuation
Rate

Official Disccunt Rate

5.84

0.061

4.50

0.135

3.00

0.182

3.00

0.205

Short-te1,n Government
Securities

5.66

0.023

5.01

0.198

7.56

0.199

2.75

0.304

Call Loney Rates

8.03

0.302

4.51

0.215

6.88

0.231

2.44

0.263

4.00

0.134

5.50

0.025

5.00

0.083

6.00

0.297

Lending :!:.ates

5.84

0.060

6.00

0.088

7.00

0.080

6.00

0.110

Long·-term Gov£ rnment
:3ond YieldE

6. 80.

0.015

5.36

0.060

7 .13

0.059

6.80

0.073

Industrial Bord Yields

7.49

0.015

6.51

0.077

7.93

0.047

7.10

0.098

Deposit Rates

Note;

Source;

Degree of fluctuation is measured by the coefficient of variance, using quarter end data for 1958~1967.

Japar, Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1967·1963 (Tokyo; Japan Times, 1968), p. 163.

I
.....
N
I

- -13completely except perhaps in very easy money periods.

Haxiraum legal

interest rates on loans determine the actual nominal rates, which are mainThese rates

tained by cartel arrangements through national bank associations.

move in small amounts with changes in the Bank of Japan discount rate, insuf-
ficient to give much flexibility to nominal loan interest rates.

The greater

flexibility of effective interest rates on loans derives from the widespread
commercial bank use of required compensatory deposits by borrowers.

Except

for prime customers (mainly selected large companies) which probably are able
to obtain as much funds as they demand at prevailing interest rates, most
customers want to borrow even more than they can at effective interest rates.
Compensatory deposit ratios probably do not increase effective interest costs
sufficiently to restrict demand to the level of supply.

1

Since the price mechanism does not clear most financial markets, the
system relies importantly on credit rationing; for many types of financial
claims it is availability rather than the interest rate which determines the
allocation of credit.

The relative importance of credit rationing versus

market (flexible interest rate) mechanisms for determining the flow of funds
varies by type of financial claim.

Hore importantly, it varies with the

degree of creditworthiness of the borrower.

Credit rationing systems, where

financial institutions are allowed to select their borrowers, inevitably
work to the advantage of the largest borrowers as default risk and transac
tions costs are minimized.

That this is the case in Japan is indicated in

a following sector.
1

This is true despite high (25-35 percent) compensatory deposit balance
requirements for small firms. A number of such grey market practices have
inevitably developed in various financial markets, but they are not suf
ficiently large or widespread to achieve equilibrium. See Hugh T. Patrick,
11
lnterest Rates and the Grey Financial Market in Japan," Pacific Affairs,
Winter 1965-66.
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Sources of Corporate Finance
As already discussed, the main function of Japan's financial system has
been to finance the corporate sector.

The availabilit y of external finance

has been very important for the realization of corporate investment plans.
Even if we make the extreme assumption that all depreciatio n allowances and
all retained profits have been used solely to finance investment (rather than
meeting liquidity and other financial needs), at a minimum 57.6 percent of
corporate net investment and 33.3 percent of gross investment between 1954-1967
was financed from external sources.

1

The corporate degree of reliance on

external finance is larger than West Germany and England, and substantial ly
greater than in the United States.
Two factors predominate in the explanation of this high degree of corporate reliance on external finance.

First, despite the partial revaluation

of assets following the early postwar inflation, most firms emerged from the
devastation of World Har II with a relatively low ratio of net worth to total
liabilities- -perhaps 40 percent on the average.

Hore important though has

been the impetus of rapid corporate growth: firms have increased capacity
so rapidly that, despite good profits and the high retention rates already
noted, they simply were not able to finance expansion from internally generaced sources.

2

As a consequence , the net worth total-liabi lity ratio for

the corporate sector has declined to 17.5 percent by March, 1968.
1

If we make the opposite extreme assumption --that all depreciatio n and
retained profits went into financial assets--the n external sources financed
considerabl y more than all of corporate net investment (236 percent) and of
gross investment {138 percent). Data derived from Table 1.
2
Profit rates on net worth are comparable to those in the same indus
tries in the United States, though some-1,hat less per unit of sales. In most
industries competition was sufficientl y severe that profits could not be so
high as to finance the desired rate of expansion.
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In seeking external finance, corporations have been constrained both
by cost and availability, both of which encouraged bank loans rather than
stock or bond issue.

Bonds are an inexpensive source of funds, so inexpen-

sive due to interest rate.controls that there are few buyers.
is very expensive, essentially for institutional reasons.

Stock issue

The characteristics

of these capital markets are treated in the following sections.

Banks-

including commercial banks, trust banks, long-term credit banks, mutual
savings banks--and other financial institutions (mainly insurance companies)
have thus been the main institutional sources of external finance.

Built

upon the base of their loans is a pyramid of trade credit, the net effect
of which is probably to spread credit out more widely than do the loans of
the financial system.
Reliance on bank loans poses additional problems in analyzing the re
lationship of external finance to corporate fixed investment.

Although com

mercial banks make significant amounts of term loans (approximately 25-45
1
percent of total loans depending on the type of bank ), in addition many
short-term loans are rolled over.
in fact finances fixed investment.
1

Indeed, considerable short-term borrowing
2

Commercial bankers in Japan are under

This includes some 15-25 percent of legally contracted short-term
loans actually contracted for longer periods. These and related data are
presented in Ministry of Finance, Banking Bureau, statistical materials
11
(
Hinkan Kinyu - Ichibu - 5," October 24, 1968, mimeographed) presented to
the Financial System Deliberation Committee (Kinyu Seido Chosa Kai).
2
of 2,000 firms surveyed in June 1968, 21.4 percent indicated that
short-term loans had been their most important external source for financing
equipment purchases over the previous two years, and 57.7 percent long-term
loans. The dependence on short-term loans was particularly large for smaller
firms, decreasing with firm size; only the largest firms had ready access to
long-term loans. Data reported in statistical materials presented to Kinyu
Seido Chosa Kai.
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no illusion that they are predominantly financing self-liquidatin g inventory
investment; they look at the total financial requirements of a borrower and
his various sources of funds.

The division of a total funding commitment

to a given borrower is divided among subscription to bonds, term loans, and
short-term loans by rules of thumb, institutional constraints on portfolio
composition, and relative profitability.

It thus makes considerable sense·

simply to look at total loans, as in Table 1, without attempting to distin
guish among term or indicated use of funds.
Nonetheless, some estimation of direct sources of long-term finance
can be made.

Table 3 provides data on the total 3ross supply of long-term

funds to finance corporate plant and equipment investment, and of the rela
tive importance of different sources.

The pattern that emerges is familiar;

long-term external financing is important; the major source is long-term
from private financial institutions, followed by credit from government fi
nancial institutions.

Stock issue has been an erratic source, reaching its

peak (absolutely as well as relatively) in the stock market boom of 1961;
overall its relative share has declined.

Bond issue also has been somewhat

erratic, and generally of lesser significance.
As has been already suggested, the financial system discriminates in
favor of large corporate borrowers and against small firms.

One factor is

the close ties that have developed among groups of companies and their prime
bank and its trust bank and insurance company affiliates.

In some, but by

no means all, of these cases the ties derive from historical zaibatsu
membership, though the postwar reforms eliminated the highly centralized
arrangements that had characterized prewar zaibatsu.

Perhaps equally

Table 3. Gross External Sources Identified as.Financing Industrial Fixed Investment
(Specific Sources as percentage of- Total)
Calendar

Corporate
Fixed
Investment
( ~t billion)

Total
Stock
External
Issue
Sources
( '...7' billion)
%

Bond
Issue
%

Private Finimce
Institution
Loans

Government Finance
Institution
Credit a

%

%

Foreign
Loans
%

1955

654.4

449.5

7.2'

0.8

63.0

29.0

b

1955

1,112.8

732.4

11.4

5.2

63.• 0

20.4

b

1957

1,567.0

1,040.8

18.2

. 3.5

58.8

19.6

"b

1958

1,446.5

1,046.7

13.6

1.6

63.2 ·

20.3

1.2

J.959

1,762.9

. 1,364.9

10.9

3.8

61.7

14.9

4_.2

1960

2,591.6

1,889.8

17.2

4.9

60.0

15.1

2.7

1961

3,740.2

2,751.1

23.1

10.8

,?1.7

11.6

Z.8

1962

3,832.2

2,715.9

19.7·

3.• 2

57 .9 .

15.3.

4!0

1963

3,986.9

3,267.1

10.7·

4.2

.67 .o

13.6

t.~ .4

1964

4,827.2

3,656.4

13.1

4.1

63.7

15.5.

3.6

1965

4~364.1

3,897.2

4.3

5.9

72.0

15.4

2~4

1966

4,944.4 ·

4,286.2

4.3

6.1

70.8 ·

16.8

2.0

1957 ,.

6,495.3.

5,430.6

3.7

5.8

72.6

15.5

2.5

1968

8,300.1

6,594.3

5.3

4.7

71.0

15.6

3.4

,.. ·

Sources: Corporate Investment: Bank of Japan, Keizai Shobumon no Toshi-Chochiku to Shikin Kabusoku (Investment
Saving and Fund Surplus or Deficit in Main Economic Sectors), July_, 1969.External Sources: B_ank of Japan, Eco;:iomic Statist:i_cs of Ja~an, annual issues.
a= Includes (relatively smail) purchases of bonds.

l
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important , large financial institutio ns conceive of their role as predomi
nantly financing big business.

Even many smaller financial institutio ns

prefer to lend to big business where possible.

The effective interest rate

different ial between loans to big and small firms is considera bly larger
th&n the default risk different ial and cost of making loans, suggestin g
either that smaller financial institutio ns are highly risk adverse
or more likely, motivated also by prestige.
Some indicatio n of this differen tial treatment 1 as well as a general
view (once again) of corporate sources and uses of funds, appears in Table
4.

Smaller firms hold more nominally liquid asset·s (because of higher com

pensatory balance requirem ents), both provide and receive more trade credit
(though the sample is probably more heavily weighted toward smaller whole
sale and retail establish ments), and do substanti ally less fixed investmen t.
Small firms have no issuing access to the bond market, and relativel y limited
access to the stock market, as in other countries .
It remains an open issue as to whether this static inefficien cy in
resource allocatio n has been all that deletorio us dynamica lly.

Adequate

research has yet to be done on differenc es by firm size in ability to ab
sorb and improve technolog y and in manageria l skills.

Hore positivel y, the

financial system has been sufficien tly competiti ve and growth-or iented in
lending among large firms that the most rapidly growing enterpris es have
been able to obtain the credit they needed; the correlati on between growth
1
Hore broadly,
of sales (or capital), and growth of bank loans is high.
ly_ Kosai et al, "Shikin Haibun Hechanism no Kento" (Discussio n of the

Mechanism of Capital Fund Allocatio n), Economic Planning Agency, Keizai Geppo,
July 1964. While there may be a question as to the direction of causality I
think it correct to say that banks competed to lend to industrie s and firms
with high growth prospects , rather than creating that growth by their lending
policies.

T°able.4. Sources and Uses of Corporate.Funds
1966

1960 .
60 Very Large
Companies

Large a
Companies.

Small b
Companies

'60 Very Large
Companies

,Large a
Companies

Small b
Corep.:i.nies

Uses
7.9

9.1

13.6

i.9

7.6

14~5

17.8

27.0

28.0

20.4

35.1

37.3

7.9

11.9

3.7

5.3

9.9

13.5

Fixed Investment

52.5

-42.1

53.1

59.3

44.9

19.7

Other

13.9'

9.8

1.6

13.0

2.4

14. 9

Cash and Deposits
Trade Credit
Inventory Investment

I

I-'

Sources
Gross Saving

\0

I

21.4

21.2

3$1.3

46.6

37.1

23.6

3.8

6.-2

22.5

6.3

9.1

12.0

17.6

15.0

16.8

40.3

28.0

ll.6

Stock Issue

12.9

11.2

5.8

1.9

2.7

3.2

Bond Issue

16.2

7.9

0.3

l.4

0.8

0

Short-te:nn Loans

12.2

18.3

15.1

8.4

15.8

· 24.3

Long-term Loans

15.4

14.6.

12.5

11.3

6.3

5~9

Trll.de Credit

11.0

21.8

4.6

. 9. 9

26.8

34.6

Other

10.9

. 5.0

22.4

20.• 5

l.0.7

8.4

Retained earnings
Depreciation

a= paid-in capital of at.least
100 million (4701 companies as of 1966)
b = paid-in capital less than
100 million
~0urcc: Ni.nistry of Finnnce materials for Kinyu Seide Chosakai, March 14, 1968, mimeographed; based on Census of
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credit allocation has been efficient for growth (if less so perhaps for wel
fare) by being directed mainly to expansion of private industrial capacity
with relatively low capital-out put ratios rather than to housing, consumer
credit, or investment in the provision of public consumer services.

The Capital Harket:

Bonds

A number of factors contribute to the underdevelo ped state of Japan's
bond market.

The early postwar experience of rampant inflation which wiped

out the value of bonds has left a strong and persisting, somewhat emotional
distaste for bonds among many individuals .

This was enhanced by the lack of

an adequate trading market until recently, so bonds were relatively illiquid.
A fairly low level of per capita income (until recently) implied small capa
city to buy bonds, both by individuals and by such long-term financial in
stitutions as life insurance companies (which indeed have grown rapidly) and
pension funds (nascant only).
than prewar.

Horeover, income is more equally distributed

Further, the public is not very aware of the relative merits

of bonds and other long-term fixed-princ ipal assets such as two or five years
deposits.
negligible.

The bond market is fairly thin and transaction s costs are not
On the other hand, certain bonds (notably those in bearer form)

have very favorable tax evasion advantages for individuals : interest is taxed
at source at 15 percent; more important, they are an excellent vehicle for
hiding wealth so as to evade inheritance and gift taxes.
Despite these other factors, clearly the most important cause of the
underdevelo ped state of the bond market is the government- imposed policy of
relatively low and unchanging interest yields on all types of new bond
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issues.

This has several major consequences.

First, potential institutional

and individual bondholders are able to obtain alternative assets of equal
risk, equal liquidity and greater yield.

In other words, market demand is

limited by the inferior characteristics of bonds; in contrast, of course,
issuers of bonds desire to issue more at the given terms.

Second, in order

to issue any bonds at all alternatives to the price mechanism had to be de
veloped.

Third, in order to minimize the unacceptability of new bond issue,

market yields determined by trading in already-issued bonds had to be kept
as close as possible to new-issue yields.

Since a free market in bonds would

inevitably result in some fluctuations in prices and yields as monetary con
ditions tightened or eased, trading has been inconsistent with the new issue
yield policy.

The policy-makers have used, in various degrees and at various

times, different ways to resolve this inconsistency: pegging, restrictions
on trading of already-issued bonds, and grudging and minor adjustments of
issue yields.
The mechanism of bond issue varies for each major category of bonds:
those issued by central government, public corporations, local governments,
corporate enterprises, and long-term credit banks.

The first three are de

termined mainly by budgetary factors without direct regard for the state
of the bond market.

The government did not reinaugurate net new bond issue

until the 1965 recession, though it refinanced its small debt as it matured. 1
1

Prior to 1965 strong private aggregate demand, rapidly increasing tax
revenues due to growth of GNP and a progressive tax structure, and a modest
government expenditure policy enabled the government to pursue a high aggre
gate demand to policy consistent with a balanced or surplus budget. See
Hugh T. Patrick, liCyclical Instability and Fiscal-Monetary Policy in Post
war Japan," in W.W. Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in
Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
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Since then the governm ent has continue d a relative ly modest deficit finan
cing program despite the resumpt ion of high aggrega te demand and rapid
growth; the politica l decision was made to increase governm ent investm ent
expendi tures somewhat as a percenta ge of GNP without increasi ng the tax
revenue share concomm itantly.
pear in Table 5.

Data on governm ent and other bond issue ap

As Figure 1 indicate s, the issue yield on governm ent bonds

has been very stable; the yield on other issues is determin ed in relation to
the yield on central governm ent bonds (and on public corpora tions bonds
prior to 1965).
The issuing system for governm ent bonds is simple: 90 percent of any
issue is allocate d among various financia l institut ions, particu larly the
large city banks; the remainin g 10 percent is allocate d to securiti es com
panies to sell to the public, or to hold whateve r is unsold (though probably
with special financia l assistan ce from the Bank of Japan).

No financia l

institut ion would serious ly consider refusine to buy its allocate d amount;
the governm ent could retaliat e in too many ways.

In a sense, this situatio n

exempli fies much of Japanese financia l, business and governm ent bureauc racy
attitude s: there are certain areas in which coopera tion rather than competi 
tion is ordained and desirab le; any losses in the small (in a specific con
text) are more than compens ated by benefits in the large (other specific

context s).

For example , the burden of forced bond purchase by city banks

is eased by allowing them as collate ral for loans from the Bank of Japan;
smaller financia l institut ions are not abie to borrow from the central bank.
In turn large financia l and business institut ions influenc e the Liberal 
Democra tic Party's decision s on the size and composi tion of the budget and
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Table 5. Bond Issue and Amount Outstanding
(in billion yen, ai· par value)

Term

Amount
Outstai1ding
December 31, 1968'

Net
Issu~
1968

Net
Issue
1960--1968

Government
-~

Short•• terrn Securities

3 months

1,792

333

1,120

Bonds

7 years

2,455

581

2,127

Local Government Bonds

7 years

1,120

163

1,032

Public Corporation Bonds

7 years

4,411

802

4,152

Industrial Bonds

7 years

2,406

154

1,865

1 year

1,281

157

1,048

4 years,

3,378

420

2,788

Banks
Discount debentures
Bonds

;n months

.,
,../_
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the attendant amount of government and public corporation bonds to be issued.
The amount of issue of government-gua ranteed bonds of public corporations,
such as the Japan Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and the Japan National Railways, is determined as one component of their overall investment finan
cing program, in turn a part of the government's Investment and Loan Program.
Somewhat more than one-quarter of these bonds are sold to users, related to
specific services provided by public corporations, or to suppliers.

The

most notable example is dendensai (Telephone-Tele graph bonds) sold to telephone subscribers as a: condition for obtainin3 a telephone.

The remainder

are absorbed by financial institutions on a basis similar to government
bonds, after securities companies have tried to sell as much as possible to
customers.
Local goverrment bond issue is small.

1

A considerable portion is placed

with local financial institutions with which deposit relationships are main
tained and with local suppliers.

The remainder is spread among financial

institutions on an allocated basis.
Of most interest here is the issuing mechanism for industrial bonds.
The decision on how many bonds will be issued, and what companies will issue
them, rests with two committees (Kisai Choseikai and Jutaku Hakkokai) made
up of the four major securities companies which serve as underwriters, the
major financial institutions (notably seven city banks and the most impor
tant long-term credit bank, the Industrial Bank of Japan), together with
1

Local governments rely heavily on tax-sharing with the central govern
ment, plus transfers and loans from the central level. For more detail see
Hugh T. Patrick, "The Financing of the Public Sector in Postwar Japan," in
L. Klein and K. 0hkawa, eds., Economic Growth-The Japanese Experience Since
the Meiji Era, (Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Ill., 1968).
-41,,
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(now) informal representations from the liinistry of Finance and Bank of
Japan.

1

The general guidelines (issue at a fixed, unchanging interest rate,

priority to public utilities, as much issue as possible depending on con
ditions) are sufficiently well set and followed that little direct govern
mental interference is necessary.

Probably the most important function of

the committee is to determine the annual amount of industrial bonds to be
issued.

The assumption of steady growth of issue is substantially influenced

by expectations of the degree of tightness or ease of financial markets,
government projections of its various types of bond issues, public sale of
recent issues, and conditions in the trading markets for already-issued
bonds.

These negotiations serve as one channel for communications among

large financial institutions, big business and the central government poli
Cyclical financial tightness, and accordingly

ticians and bureaucrats.

higher interest rates on competing assets, have indeed induced a strong
cyclical pattern to new bond issue; the major financial institutions have
been able to damp down total issue, while corporate issuers have not worried
greatly since they will be financed instead by bank loans, if at a somewhat
higher rate of interest.

2

Once the total has been determined, the committee has well-defined rules
of thumb for allocation among the many potential issuers and various potential
1

These committees trace directly from prewar syndicates underwriting
industrial bond issues, though markets were free then. This historical
continuity explains in substantial part the continuing important roles of
the Industrial Bank and Hitsui Bank, and the system of direct, informal
negotiation.
2
see Takashi Ishigoro, "Koshasai Ichiba no Shomondai," (Some Problems
of the Bond Harket), Japan Development Bank, Chosa Geppo, Vol. 16, No. 9
(December 1967).
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buyers, almost entirely institutional.

First priority goes to the electric

power and gas companies; it is generally accepted that they and certain
other public utilities provide services essential for the continued opera
tion of the economy.

The rule is that roughly 40 percent of new bond issue

will be by the nine electric power companies; purchase is distributed among
the major banks and insurance companies proportional to size.

The remaining 60 percent is divided amons the largest 225 or so indus
trial enterprises which meet the criteria for eli3ibility: listing on a
major stock exchange, certain paid-in capital and net worth level, minimum
dividend rate relative to par value of shares, and certain other financial
ratios.

These criteria are used also to divide companies into five cate

gories of decreasing creditworthiness.

Not only are there small issue

yield differentials by category, but those eight companies in the top
category can issue bonds most frequently--every two months or so.

In

contrast, those in the bottom category (firms which have not paid dividends
recently) can issue only to refinance maturing bonds.

Rules of thumb, and

the total to be issued, determine the amount a particular company is allowed
to issue.
Almost all (89 percent at the end of 1968) of industrial bond issues
are held by financial institutions, having been originally purchased by
them.

The main bank of a given industrial issuer is the largest purchaser;

bond purchase is a substitute for term loans.

Typically, the underwriting

security company draws up a list of buyers and amount to be purchased by
each on the basis of the financial institution's degree of connection with
the issuer.

These include the main bank, other city bank lenders to the
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firm, affiliated insurance companies and local bank lenders (to locak plants,
Financial institution s closely connected to the issuer usually absorb

etc).

60-80 percent of a new issue, the rest being spread among reciprocatin g finan~
cial institution s, suppliers and users (a small proportion) , and any individual
buyers.
The yield to subscribers for industrial bonds has been 7 1/2 - 8 percent.
Costs of issuance have declined somewhat in recent years, now on the order
of 0.95 - 1.10 percentage points.

While comparable to other countries, these

costs may be high because there are no underwritin g risks.

The cost to

corporate issuers is only slightly (probably less than 0.5 percentage points)
below that of loans of comparable maturity (taking into account compensator y
balances).

Even so, corporate issuers are sufficientl y sensitive to the

differentia l that they would issue more bonds if possible at prevailing
rates; one indication is that certain major companies have issued bonds
in foreign capital markets with higher yields than equivalent issue in
Japan.

Since the main bank also earns trustee fees from the bond issue

of its customers it may be indifferent between bonds and loans.
The final category--a nd quantitativ ely important as is clear from Table
5--are bonds issued by mainly the three long-term credit banks, of which
the Industrial Bank of Japan is the most important, and by certain other
specialized banks.

The function of the long-term credit banks is clear

from their title; they make long-term loans (typically seven to ten years),
primarily to finance plant and equipment investment, and primarily to large
industrial enterprises .

They are enjoined from collecting deposits from
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other than their borrowers and from government instrumentalities (of negli
gible importance).

Their main source of funds is the issuance of bank

debentures sold mainly to individuals through securities companies (at a
handsome commission of about 1 percent) at a yield to buyers somewhat above
the one-year time deposit rate; and five year bank bonds, sold mainly to
commercial banks and other financial institutions.

1

Long-term credit banks

have a long history in Japan, founded under government encouragement in
line with its view that specialized financial institutions should exist to
perform specialized financing functions.
But why should other financial institutions purchase bank debentures
from what after all are increasingly regarded as competitors as department
store banking has begun to emerge?
to.

One reason is that they are expected

But there is considerably more to the answer than that.

Essentially

the question is who will obtain access to the funds that long-term credit
banks obtain from individuals.
debenture issues.

City banks are major purchasers of bank

Each city bank knows that the long-term credit banks

will make loans to that city bank's preferred group of customers in amount
approximately double the amount of bank debentures which that city bank
purchases.

With long-term loanable funds in especially short supply, this

is one way to help prime customers (no doubt with a quid pro quo some
where else in the bank-customer relationship).

This commitment of loans

amounting to two times bond purchase is long-run; it does not need to be
negotiated case-by-case, or even on an annual basis.
1

rn addition, borrowers are usually required to purchase bank bonds
equal to about 10 percent of their loan (the interest rate differential is
about 1 percentage point), as well as to hold compensating deposit balances
of about 15 percent.
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Local banks and smaller financial institutions have similar incentives
to purchase bank debentures.

A long-term credit bank loan to an enterprise

is a clear indication of its high quality; this not only enhances local
bank prestige (its customers are good companies) but makes it easier to put
together a package of funds for that company from other sources (such as
insurance companies) as well.

Moreover, long~term credit bank loans to small

business are usually done ·through the agency of smaller financial institutions,
which thereby earn a commission.

It pays to have a good relationship with

the long-term credit banks.
This somewhat lenghy discussion of the non-market mechanism by which
various categories of bonds are issued in Japan suggests how the system
operates.

As an issuing mechanism it wotks effectively for the given quan

tities; yet financial institutions and other buyers are sufficiently eco
nomically rational that in fact only relatively small amounts of bonds are
issued.
The fundamental problems of this mechanism of bond issue are laid bare
when holders decide to sell their bonds prior to maturity.

Free financial

markets meet this desire through trading in secondary markets--over- the
counter or in listed bond markets--with supply equated to demand by changes
in bond prices and hence yields.

In such markets new issue yields are de

termined predominantly by the yield on already-issued securities, and fluctu
ate according to market conditions.

In Japan the co-existence of the fixed

interest system of new bond issue and a free secondary market of fluctua
ting yields implies at times a gap in yields which a free market would
arbitrage away.

.::.31-

How have the monetary authorities handled this contradiction?

The main

approach prior to 1966 was simply not to allow a secondary market in bonds
to exist in any meaningful, substantial sense.s;:,--..sc. The bond market was
opened through listing on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in April 1956, but transactions were limited as the government put pressure on financial institutions
not to sell at yields different from new-issue yields.

Even this market was

closed in April 1962, when a tight money policy was being pursued, and was
not re-opened until February 1966.

Of course some over-the-counter trans

actions were made at higher yields, but they were semi-clandestine and prob
ably never very large in aggregate.
The one exception was the market in seven-year Telephone-Telegraph
bonds (dendensai). Many telephone subscribers regarded these as a cost of
obtaining phone service rather than as a financial asset, so sold them im
mediately.

A secondary market was allowed to develop in Tel-Tel bonds, so

that from 1955 on they have been the best indicator of market-determined
long-term interest rates.

The yield line for Tel-Tel bonds in Figure 1

make clear the fluctuations of long-term interest rates over the cycle, and
the tendency for free market rates to be above the controlled rates for
new issues.

The long-term market yield (as measured by the Tel-Tel bonds)

has been sensitive to changes in the call rate; a slightly higher elasticity
relationship for Japan than West Germany suggests that these markets oper
ate reasonably well in Japan.

1

The secondary market in bonds has operated rather freely and actively
since February 1966.
1

The government had long been under pressure to liberalize

see Ishiguro, ~- cit., p. 7.
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capital markets as well as everything else.

An easy fiscal-money policy

following the 1965 recession had pushed market interest rates down suffi
ciently so that it was judged (correctly) that market yields would not
diverge significantly from the new-issue fixed yield structure.
There are two secondary bond markets: transactions in listed bonds
on the major stock exchanges; and an over-the-counter market.

The listed

market is notational: only a small, though representative, proportion of
outstanding bonds are listed; standard published yield data are derived from
transactions in listed bonds; only 2-3 percent of all bond trades are in
the listed market.

The yields in the over-the-counter market appear only

negligibly higher than in the listed market.

1

However, the over-the-counter

market is certainly less than perfect, with special deals and lack of know
ledge, so published data on prices and rates may be incorrect.
Early success in having only a negligible gap between market-determined
yields on already-issued bonds and the fixed rate on new issues persisted
only until mid-1967.

For balance-of-payments reasons the monetary authori

ties initiated a tight money policy at that time, with interest rates
rising.

The gap between secondary market yield and new issue yield widened

significantly, as sho,,m in Figure 2.

An easing of money brought some re

duction in market rates in the spring of 1968, but some tightening in 1968
and throughout 1969 kept the gap wide.
The existence of such a gap of course made the new issue market more
attractive than ever, with pressures on the government and others to reduce
1
A preliminary examination of published data on yields in both markets
suggest this conclusion, though further research is needed. Data appear in
Japan Securities Dealers Association, Choken Gyoho (Securities Business),
monthly.
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issue and to increase issue yields.
essentially by type of bond.

The system's response has been varied,

As indicated in Figure 2, the market yield on

government bonds was kept very close to the new issue yeild; some decrease
in price and increase in market yield occurred for local government and
corporate industrial bonds; and a larger increase in market yield prevailed
on bank bonds.

Accordingly, the margin between governments and other bonds

widened substantially,as demonstrated in Figure 3.

This was due more to

rationing and other non-market reasons rather than to investor increased
aversion to whatever (slight) default risk that exists.
The market yield on government bonds was held down, despite the over
all rise in interest rates, by pegging.

The Bank of Japan purchased govern

ment bonds in the market even more vigorously in 1968 than in 1967.

Finan

cial institutions were informally but vigorously urged not to sell in the
market despite their shortage of funds relative to alternative attractive
investments.

Moreover, the larger institutions have had an interest in

maintaining the market both because they use their government bonds exten
sively as collateral (valued at market) for loans from the Bank of Japan;
and because they want to make what sales they can to the Bank of Japan at
a good price.

Smaller institutions and interest-sensitive individuals have

taken the opportunity to unload their holdings of government bonds.

At

the same time the government continues to place new issue by allocation to
financial institutions.

The securities companies continue to sell part of

their allocation to those individuals who are highly risk averse, interest
rate insensitive, uninformed, and/or gullible.
arranges to finance the rest,
1

1

Presumably the Bank of Japan

though the data are difficult to obtain.

The Bank of Japan is precluded from purchasing long-term government
bonds until one year has elapsed after issue, but it can readily make loans
with any government bonds as collateral, or make other substitute arrangements.
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l~1y has the price declined--and the yield risen--so much more for bank
bends than for corporate and local government bonds?

Here the answer seems

to lie in the closer customer relationships that financial institutions have
with corporations and local governments than with the long-term credit banks.
For the sake of these relationships, and to help new issues by them, the
major financial institutions are reluctant to sell their holdings of corporate
or local government bonds, and may even help support the market.

After a

short learning process (from August 1967 to February 1968) holders of bank
bonds evidently came to regard them as rather freely tradeable: their yield
moves very closely ~vith the Tel-Tel bond yields (Figure 3).

Sale of bank

bonds became the first item for portfolio adjustment, even while (of neces
sity) newly-issued bank bonds were being subscribed to.

This gap in yields

has of course put the long-term er.edit banks in a difficult position, as net
new issue has tended to decreas-.

The effective yield on one-year discount

deb8ntures, sold mainly to individuals, has been increased by adding a traf
fic insurance feature while maintaining the fixed interest rate.

It is not

entirely clear how they have succeeded recently in selling their five-year
bonds--no doubt a continuation of administrative pressure and some surrep
titious price shading.
The justification for the initial development and persistence of the
government's policy of relatively low fixed interest rates, especially for
long-term claims, has never been clearly articulated.

1

There are a number

1The interest rate structure has been too low to clear financial
markets in Japan, but was continuously above foreign interest rates until
1968. The monetary authorities effectively control foreign short-term
capital flows by a variety of indirect methods (special reserve require
ments, interest rate ceilings, loan limits, etc.) so as to reduce adverse
effects of interest rate differentials.

Figure_ ~- Gap b.etween Secondary Marke_t Yield. on Governme nt Bonds and on Other Bonds
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of strands in the argument, many of them familiar if benighted.

Policy-makers

have long felt that long-term investment, especially in "key industries,"
should be encouraged by low interest rates.

They worry about interest as a

cost of production, particularly in export competition.

Hore substantially,

they suggest that investment demand and saving supply are both interest-in
elastic, at least within a reasonable upward range; on the other hand, no one
suggests that interest rates should remain semi-controlled but lowered to
say 3-4 percent.

And then there is the Ministry of Finance prejudice against

high rates on government debt--not simply as a budgetary cost item but as a
matter of national prestige.

And some, though by no means all, government

bureaucrats prefer the present system of more direct, if informal

controls,

with close and continuous contact and exchange of information, over a more
impersonal, perhaps less predictable, free market system.

After all, the

proof is in the pudding: the present system, broadly viewed, has worked very
well indeed by growth criteria.

It's not clear to what degree consultation,

administrative guidance, and restriction of market mechanisms are essential
for success, or perhaps even hamper it, but why take a chance changing things.
Support of the present system, and opposition to the development of
a large bond market with fluctuating interest rates equilibrating demand and
supply in outstanding and new issues, is not limited to government bureau
crats.

Hany large financial institutions prefer a small bond market, even

if they have to subsidize it.
loans.

Bonds, after all, are a substitute for their

Hore important, given the always-sensed shortage of funds, bonds are

a substitute for their time deposits, the interest rates for which are rela
tively low.

Public sector issuers probably prefer the present system; after
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all their financial needs

are reasonably well accomodated by the allocation

system, and the interest costs are less than they would be in a free market
system.

Big business issuers of bonds would probably prefer a free market

mechanism so that they could issue more bonds, even at somewhat higher cost.
However, the interest saving over long-term loans is not great, and after
all they have preferred access to loans, so the incentive to rock the boat
is not great.
The main beneficiaries of a large, vigorous, unrestricted bond market
would be individual wealth holders, smaller financial institutions, and
medium-sized companies and perhaps insurance companies and their policy
holders.

Individuals would benefit from higher rates and, probably more im

portant would become more aware of the opportunities they currently forego.
Moreover, bond competition would put pressure to raise and adjust more
flexibly interest rates on time deposits.

However, the potential benefi

ciaries are not well organized, and do not have great political strength.

The Capital Market: Equity Shares
The data provided above (notably in Tables 1, 3, and 4) indicate that
stock issue for the period as a whole has not been a major source of external
finance and that its role has been erratic, peaking in 1961.

The reasons

are quite different from those governing the non-development of the bond
market.

Of course some factors limit both--the fairly low per capita in

comes, relatively equal income distribution, and small size of life insurance
companies and pension funds.

Yet stocks are bought and sold in a free market

and there are few legal or other governmental restrictions on new stock
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issue.

The market mechanism is allowed full play.
The major factor retarding stock issue as an external source of cor

porate finance operates on the supply side, rather than on the demand
as in the case of the bond market.

side

For a combination of instiuttional rea

sons stock issue is a very expensive source of funds--some 16-18 percent.
As in other countries, interest is deductible from corporate pre-tax profits
as a cost while dividends are subject to the corporate profits tax (at a
slightly lower rate than that on retained earnings).

Hore important, it has

bsEn the custom since stock was first issued in the 1880's to make new issue
at par

1

in the form of rights to current stockholders, regardless of the •~
-It

prevailing market price (so long as it is greater than par) .

Tied to this

has been the practice to quote the dividend rate relative to par, and to
have a high dividend rate--at least 10 percent. 2

This dividend rate is

maintained even after new shares are issued,
Before discussing the supply and demand side of the stock market in
more detail, let me sketch in the institutional structure of the market.
Stock exchanges exist in eight major cities, but about three-quarters of
the value of trading is done on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and most of the
remainder on the Osaka Stock Exchange.
1

The Tokyo Exchange has 83 securities

Par is typically 50 yen (14 cents) or, in a few instances 500 yen
($1.49); trading in the former is in 1000-share units, the latter in 100share units.
2
rn the early phase of industrialization this is the rate individuals
demanded to purchase shares; since that meant almost complete payout of pro
fits in many cases, it is not surprising that firms then issued new shares
as a source of finance and that stock prices did not go so far above par.
The tradition of dividends at least 10 percent of par continues to be so
strong that some large firms--such as the steel companies--in certain re
cession periods have maintained that dividend rate, despite inadequate
profits (less than payout), by borrowing.
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dealer members.

The "Big Four'i securities companies have a predominant

position in the industry. Securities

dealers may serve not only as brokers,

but also as dealers on their own account, underwriters, and participants in
syndicates distributing securities.

1

regulated than in the United States.

The securities industry is less well
Turnover is large--greater relative

to the number of shares outstanding than in the United States--despite a
large proportion of shares stably held by institutions and some individuals.
With markets somewhat thin, there is some ·manipulation, advantageous use
of insider information, flogging of shares in particular companies, and
other market imperfections-- but not enough to discredit the market severely.
The most important stock market--in value, transactions, and pres
tige--is the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

On it are listed

(as of September 1969) some 694 companies with a market value of $40.8 bil
2
In 1961 a second
lion and a paid-in capital par value of $15.0 billion.
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange was inaugurated to trade shares in
smaller companies previously traded over-the-counte r.

Some 550 companies

are listed but with a market value c:if only $3.3 billion, and paid-in capital
par value of $1.1 billion.

There is not a substantial over-the-counte r

market in shares of other, smaller companies.

To be traded (and to sell

new shares publicly) smaller firms try to meet the standard listing require
ments of the second section, while many firms on the second section attempt
1

Host new stock issu~s are not underwritten since they are sold on a
rights basis to stockholders.
2
Tokyo Stock Exchange, Research and Statistics Department, 'Monthly
Statistics Report, No. 155 (September 1968), in Japanese and English.
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eventually to move up to the first section.
The distribution of stock ownership is given in Table 6.

While based

on the number of shares outstanding without weighting for their value, the
distribution is in line with flow-of-funds value data.

However, it includes

a much larger number of companies than those listed on stock exchanges; for
the latter the share of financial institutions, securities companies, and
investment trusts loom larger.
Most individual Japanese investors apparently regard publicly-listed
stock as a quite risky opportunity for capital gains suitable mainly for
speculation.

As in other countries stock is purchased only after substantial

time deposits have been accumulated.
tal gain rather than dividends.

2

l

Yield is perceived of mainly as capi-

Tax laws are advantageous: there is no

tax for short-term or long-term capital gains.
run, speculative approach to stock purchase.

This contributes to a short
As with interest, dividends

are accorded favorable income tax treatment.
Institutional buyers have had longer-run objectives in purchasing and
holding stock.

They are no doubt 1nore aware of the long-run appreciation

of stock value in Japan's dynamic economy.

Life insurance companies hold

almost a quarter of their assets in stock, and other insurance companies

1 According to survey data, families with a net worth in financial
assets on average of about $1,200 hold only 6.7 percent in stock (including
mutual funds); the proportion rises by income (and wealth) group to 19.3
percent for families with a net worth of $60,750. Bondholdings are much
smaller: 2.2 percent for the former group and 3.2 percent for the latter.
Japan Economic Planning Agency, Economic Survey of Japan, 1967-1968,
(English edition, Tokyo: Japan Times, 1968), p. 168.
2
For example, certain shares, such as steel companies and electric
power companies, have had little price movement and dividend yields of 7-10
percent, compared with 5.5 percent for one-year time deposits. Round lots
could be purchased for as little as $150-200; transactions costs would absorb
the yield differential only for short periods of stock holding.

Table 6
by

Stock 0mw.rsh5-p.
n of
Distd.1mlio----~-- -~-~.. ------------~-~---~---

(in percent)·.

.42.0

Individuals
Corporate Enterprises

23.1

Financial Institution s

26.2

SecurH_ics Cornpnn:i.es
Investment Trusts

a

2.2

Government Institution s

0,3

Foreign En terpr is es b

1.9

Other Foreigners

.a.
mutua.1 f·un d.Ss

. J cases of direct investmerit
bma1n.y

Not~:

Source:

Based on data from all 4,686 companies with paid
in capital of¥ 100 million ($278,000) or more,
including both listed and unlisted companies.

Hank of: Jo.pans Statistics D2p~rtr,12.nts Economic
Stat.istfrs_A nnunl,__1968 (March, 1969), p. H,i-:
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more than 30 percent (both at book value); perhaps they would hold even more
except for legal restrictions.

For banks and corporate enterprises perhaps

an even more important objective has been to maintain and cement good relation
ships with customers and other friendly firms.

1

Stock ownership of large firms is highly diffused in Jap~n, mainly as
a consequence of Allied Occupation zaibatsu dissolution and anti-trust reforms.
As a consequence there is substantial separation of ownership and control,
which rests in the hands of a self-perpetuating management.
and raids by dissident stockholders are unknown.

Take-over bids

One reason of course is

that for many companies a majority of the shares are held by friendly, af
filiated, hence safe, institutions and certain individuals--an objective
that management strives for.

Only if management performs very poorly indeed

is it subject to dismissal, and then at the in~tigation of the company's
main bank.
lianagement thus has greater latitude both in the mix of its objectives
and in its operations.

Nanagement does not view the company's interests as

necessarily identical with stockholders; for this reason it regards new
stock issue at par as a high-cost source of external financin8 rather than
simply as a means of providing some capital gains to stockholders.

Profit

maximization is not the sole objective; also important are growth, market
share, and to some extent employee welfare and the "national interest!'
(though usually defined to business' advantage).
Since the main constraint on new stock issue is its high cost because
1

Banks cannot hold more than 10 percent of the shares of any corpora
tion; many business corporations of course hold large amounts of stock in
subsidiaries.
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of the combina tion of issuance at par and high dividend rates,
the system and issue stock at slightly under market prices?

1

why not change

If this were

done firms could raise conside rably more funds in any given issuance of share·s
and., more importa ntly, at a cost of funds highly competi tive with long-ter m
loans or bond issue.

The answer is that stockho lders object strenuou sly: they

make a capital gain out of the present system which would instead go to the
company.

Indeed, individu als demand for a particu lar company 's shares is much

influenc ed by expecta tions whether it will soon issue new rights and in what
amount.

2

For similar reasons stockho lders rejected convert ible bond issues,

which have to be approved at stockho lder meeting s.

Even so stock issuance

at market price occurs to some degree-- on average about 5-6 percent of total
new paid-in capital, having reached a peak of 8. 8 percent in 1961.

But even

in those cases it has been usually achieved as part of a package includin g a
few shares at (15 percent below) market, a few shares distribu ted free, and
most issued at par.
Under these circums tances, why do listed compani es issue new shares at
3 After all, it is cheaper to borrow. 4 One importan t reason is that
all?
1

of the 617 compani es listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchang e, 83.3 percent paid dividend s of 10 percent or more of par, and
another 10.6 percent paid 8 or 9 percent.
2
This can be simply illustra ted. Suppose the market sets the combina 
tion of yield and growth on a company such that a 5 percent dividend yield
on market price is sufficie nt; a 5 yen dividend (10 percent of par of 50
yen) implies a price of 100 yen. But if new shares are issued at 50, they
will also be worth about 100 yen . . This opportu nity for capital gain drives
up the demand for old (pre-rig hts) shares to 150 yen.
3
Tbe followin g discussi on excludes compani es in sick industr ies, or
with weak profit perform ance, which issue stock dividend s in place of cash
dividend s.
4
This may not be true, especia lly for smaller , or lower priority com
panies, in tight money periods when credit is not availab le; stock issuance
apparen tly has increase d in such periods even though stock prices are
relative ly depresse d.
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the llinistry of Finance and major institutional lenders deplore continuous
declines in the ratio of net worth to total liabilities, and put pressure
on companies to issue stock in order to increase these ratios.

Noreover

many firms regard it as natural to issue new shares every several years, as
a part of their external financing program and for the sake of stockholders-
without analyzing the matter carefully.

But this explanation does not tell

us much.
I regard the following set of interrelated hypothesis as useful though
Management is concerned with its own

they have not been adequately tested.

good performance, for reasons of salary, bonus, prestige and maintenance of
position.

Two criteria of good performance are: maintenance of a certain

"normal" dividend per share measured at par; and total dividend payout fal
ling within an acceptable range,
tax (O < x

<

x

payout ratio< y < 100).

cally and institutionally.
complain; above

y

to

y

percent, of total profits after

lloth criteria have developed histori

For a payout ratio less than

x

stockholders

the firm retains insufficient funds to finance expansion,

particularly since lenders insist on some share of new projects being fi

nanced internally.
Given this institutional environment, what is rational management be

havior concerning dividend policy and stock issue, both secularly and
cyclically?

The first objective is to maintain the "normal'' dividend rate,

Hanagement cannot shift the definition of the "normal" dividend rate down

ward--since it would be de facto indication of poor managerial performance-
unless it is generally recognized as a firm in a sicl~, declining industry
(for example, coal mining) or perhaps a still sick but growine industry
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(shipping).

On the other hand, management has little incentive to shift the

definition of the "norma1u dividend rate upward, because the short-run ad
vantage of being praised for "excellent performance'' is more than offset by the longe-r--rurr uncer.tainty over profits .and ··hence whether the-.higher-'1 n-ormaltt
dividend ·rate. can always· be main.tained. - It is safer .to avoid .the risk.of
setting a higher norm.
Secular.ly·profits .increase, so for a given number of .shares and given··
"normal" dividend rate the payout ratio decreases.

As it goes below

x ,

management has two ways. to raise the payout ratio : to increase the dividend

rate or to increase the number of shares outstanding.

Hanagement does not ·

increase the dividend rate for two reasons : it• do·es not -want to raise th.e
normal rate, and it receives nothing in return.

In contrast, if it issues

additional shares and maintains the normal dividend rate, it obtains addi
tional external funds and raises the net worth ratio.

Since the company has

to increase payout anyway, ~nee the ratio falls below

x ·, in effect· the

1
cost of stock issue is zero, · rather than the high effective cost the firm···

has above ~x . · (This should not be viewed as discontinuous : as ·payout d.e--.clines toward

x the· presure to increase payout, and hence to issue stock,

in tens ifies . )
The secular trend is somewhat. .complicated by cyclical.fluctuations
in corporate profits.

Given the high degree .of. leverage (int.erest--costsL

.despite smoothing accounting window-dressing which overs.tates profits in
recession and
1

understates them in booms, the ..absolute fluctuations. in

Actually positive (if small) if there is some increased risk of
maintaining in the future the normal dividend rate due to the increased
number of shares.
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profits have been wide.

Thus in some recessions the "normal" dividend rate

may imply a payout ratio greater than
be reduced.

y , in which case the rate has to

As soon as profits recover sufficiently, however, the "normal"

dividend rate is resumed.

In contrast in booms profits may be exceptionally

high; corporations may opt for a one-time special extra dividend on the
grounds that the amount of profits is not sustainable so that stock should
not be issued.
I have suggested that the "normal" dividend rate may be on the order
of 10 percent of par.
70 percent.

The acceptable payout ratio range may be between 30-

However, these institutionally-determ ined ratios probably vary

somewhat by industry, and perhaps even by firm.

Horeover, they are not im

mutable: norms gradually change witlt altered patterns of performance, cer
tainly for industries at least.
One might expect that Japan's outstanding growth performance and
prospects, together with the limited neu supply of shares, would have pushed
stock prices up dramatically and market valuations of stock a high multiple
of earnings.

Hhile prices have indeed moved dramatically, price-earnings

ratios have remained low relative to the United States--on average for the
Tokyo first section not more than about 12 times.

The focus on short-term

gains rather than long-run appreciation in value based on increases in
profits per share is one factor.

Indeed, most Japanese investors seem to

remain more interested in a company's likelihood of neH share issue at par
than in its price-earnings ratio.

Only in recent years, and at the insti

gation mainly of American analysts, have data on

P/E

ratios begun to be

published, although the underlying data have always been available.
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Another factor has been the public's perception that stocks are highly
speculative, with considerable risk of price decreases.

This view is well

based in fact; many individuals Here burned in the 1961 speculative boom and
From a 1958 low of about 400 the Tokyo row-Jones went to 1356 by the

crash.

end of 1960.

By early 1961 everybody in Japan had heard how one's money

could be doubled in a few weeks or months by purchasing stock; as in specu
lative manias every,;-,here many people entered the stock market for the first
Securities houses encouraged the euphoric boom; salesmen marketed

time.

shares door-to-door, and by motorcycle from fannhouse to farmhouse.

The mar

ket peaked at 1830 in July 1961 before slidinc off some 30 percent by year
end.

The public retired, unhappy, from the stock market, and only in the

last year or so has begun to return.

1

It was not until late 1968 that the

market once again reached its 1961 Iow-Jones peak, and then at much lower
price-earnings ratios.
Together;·,;.1ith everything else related to the stock market, neH issues
peaked in 1961--as both a relative and an absolute source of external fi
The stock mark.et boom made it easy (practically for the first

nance.

time) to issue ne,·, shares, and indeed issuance fed the boom psychology.

At

the same time money was fairly tight, so for various reasons firms brought
out new stock issues.

The events of 1961 9utshadow the cyclical pattern

of stock issue earlier noted.

Subsequently neH issue slumped absolutely

and relatively until the late 1960 's.

~-1ith the current boom in the stock

market, renewed tightness of money, and gradually changing attitudes about
1

rnvestment trusts (mutual funds) Here a major vehicle in 1961, since
they have shrunk substantially, with cancellations and redemptions out
weighing neu subscriptions.

issuance at par, new issue is again on the rise.
considerably less than earlier.

Yet its significance remains

Projections for i.970 boast that the issuance

of stock will be the second highest on record--second to 1961.

With the

total industrial demand for external funds more than double the 1961 level,
stock issuance still has far to go even to reach its earlier relative sig
nificance.

Conclusion
Japan presents a, superficially at least, anomalous case where corporate
sector reliance on external finance is extremely high yet reliance on bond and
stock issue as a source of funds is very lou.

This has been possible because

the financial system has effectively intermediated by providing substitutes
for bonds and stock issue in the form of long-term and to some extent even
short-term loans.
It is easy to see how long-term loans can be fairly close substitutes
for bonds, since the difference in default risk is not substantial and bonds
in Japan are not so liquid anyhow, at least for major financial institutions.
Since in effect the Bank of Japan guarantees major financial institutions
that they will not suffer a liquidity crisis singly or as a group,this would
not be a strong motive for a free bond martet.

The main opportunity fore

gone under the present system is the ability of a large financial institution
to adjust its portfolio composition by substantial bond sales.
The apparent willingness of financial institutions to allow the sub
stitution, to a substantial degree, of loans for stock with the attendant
decline in large corporate net worth ratios is less obviously explained.
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In effect banks )rnve taken on much of the risk of bankruptcy of large corpora
This risk is all the Breater because there are no limits on the size

tions.

of loans to individual companies, so loan balances of 40 percent, 60 percent,
or even 100 percent of a bank's net worth are typical.
big business bankruptcy or insolvency

1

However, the risk of

is borne to a substantial degree by

society (together with the stockholders) rather than by creditors--at least
large creditors.

In effect, large financial institutions are such heavy

creditors of big business that they must continue to make loans under any
circumstances; the financial system is sufficiently centralized that the Bank
of Japan cannot afford to let any major financial institution close its doors
. 2
. 1
.
f or f ear o f a genera 1 f inancia panic.

This socialization of risk seems

on the whole sensible, even though it continues the discrimination in favor
of bigness.
To what extent has an underdeveloped capital market impeded Japan's
economic performance?

Of course it is difficult to say anything seriously

hampers economic growth in an economy whose real GNP rises 10 percent per
year for year after year, and where recessions are considered in terms of
annual growth rates of only 3 or 4 or 5 percent.
1

Beyond that, there is no

Except for management malfeasance, in Hhich case the firm is still
saved by its creditors.
2
The determination, and success, of the Bank·of Japan is shown in
its handling of the de facto bankruptcy of Japan's fourth largest security
dealer, which found itself with a net worth of about minus $40 million in
1965 when it bought stocks and expanded offices in expectation of stock
price rises, when in fact they declined. The Bank of Japan financed
continued operation and reorganization under new management with no losses
to customers. The reorganized company, still Japan's fourth largest
security house, has been able to anticipate loan repayments from high
profits in the 1968-1969 stock market boom.
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evidence that underdeveloped capital markets have had any adverse effect on
saving rate, or even on the realized investment rate.

The large firms that

normally would be able to issue stock and bonds in free capital markets
have had preferred access to loans.

Perhaps the most serious adverse impact

has been on smaller firms which would like to raise funds through the capi
tal market, but probably the allocative effect has not been all that great.
Presumably investment allocation would have been somewhat more efficient
if funds had been rationed by interest rates in free markets, but Japan's
high growth performance--an d success in financin8 rapidly growing, innova
tive, firms--suggest that the efficiency loss has not been substantial.
In welfare terms there has been some cost in having the sort of finan
cial system of which Japan's capital markets are symbolic.

Semi-control

over financial markets has favored plant and equipment investment over
housing and durable goods consumption, favored large business firms over
small, large financial institutions over small, and investors over indi
vidual savers who hold their assets in time deposits, insurance and the
like.

Yet those who have borne these costs have been hurt relatively, not

absolutely; with 10 percent growth, widely distributed, everyone is doing
well in Japan.
foregone.

They are not greatly m-rnre of the potential opportunities

And they are much less organized than big business and by finance

to put pressure on the government.
The greatest cost, in my subjective, foreign eyes, of Japan's present
financial system is political, not economic.

The system perpetuates and

enhances the power of big business, large financial institutions, and the
central government bureaucracy with which it deals, in the total society
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of Japan.

There are mitigations.

So far this power structure has produced

the goods, and dispersed them to all Japanese.

Horeover, there is no mono

lithic establishment; Japan well blends cooperation and competition, and
members of the elite meritocracy frequently compete with each other over
specific issues and goals.
Returning to the more narrow topic of this essay, what prospects are
there for the future expansion of the role of Japan's capital markets?
The development of a real, vigorous bond market of substantial size
can occur only when bonds are made an attractive financial asset for indi
vidual and institutional holders of wealth, i.e., when yields on both new
issues and outstanding bonds are determined by the interplay of supply and
demand in free markets.

I am skeptical that this will be soon achieved.

The vested interests in government and finance are probably too great to
bring about quickly the sweeping changes in the entire financial system that
are implied in the freeing of interest rates on bonds.

I foresee a con

tinued period of slow groping trn-rnrd reduction of the differentials between
new and old bond yields--a slight increase in issue interest rates, Bank
of Japan support of certain bond markets, etc.--but reliance mainly on the
vague hope that somehm-1 as the economy continues to grow interest rates
will gradually come down of their mm accord.
Prospects look somewhat better for the grouth of stock issuance.

In

recent months several smaller, aggressive firms with outstanding growth
performance have successfully issued through public subscription new shares
at close to market value, as have several large firms.

Often this has been

done by share issue in foreign (European or American) markets.

Indeed a
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strange kind of intermediation has developed, and may become significant,
in which Japanese firms make new issues at market value to foreign investors,
who then return the shares to the Tokyo market for sale to Japanese inves
tors as soon as the domestic price of the shares rises.

Thus it is estimated

that almost 8 percent of c_orporate funds from stock issue in 1969 will come
from issuance at market, and that the rate will approach 15 percent in 1970. 1
If the rigidity of the system of issuance at par is successfully breached,
and it probably Hill be increasingly, then stocT: issue could well become an
extremely important source of funds for Japanese corporations.

1

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, International Heekly Edition, November 25,
1969, p. 1

